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Drawing upon scholarly research and his many years of distinguished service as a government lawyer, Chairman of the Board
of Immigration Appeals, and editor, Maurice Roberts has provided
an accurate description of many of the current problems with the
Immigration and Naturalization Service ( INS ) and offers a provocative proposal that Congress create an article I immigration
court to deal with them. As such, the Roberts article is a significant addition to the literature at a time when the public's interest
and emotions again are focused directly on immigration issues,
including governmental costs, "illegal" aliens, foreign workers,
and "new seed" immigration.'
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1. The U.S. Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, which
will soon report to Congress, is deeply split over many controversial issues. The
lengthy record following nationwide hearings is replete with contradictory proposals to remedy the problems Mr. Roberts identifies and contains many conflicting
statements as to the current objectives of U.S. policy. There is little disagreement,
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migration court and the constitutionality of the court as proposed,
it is appropriate to consider whether the proposal properly addresses priorities in institutional reform. 2 Most aliens never face
exclusion or deportation hearings or become enmeshed in motions to reconsider or judicial or administrative appeals. Indigent
and unrepresented (by attorneys or others), they usually attain
their goals or abandon their efforts on the first pass in the application process. Thus, their nightmare is not the nicety of cross-examination rights, but substantive complexity, confusing forms
(for which they often wait in lines which queue at 6 A.M. in metropolitan centers for hours, sometimes only to be ordered to return another day), language barriers, inadequate time to consult
poorly trained INS contact representatives, unanswered correspondence, lost files, and outrageous administrative delay often
affecting substantive rights.3 These matters are only compounded
4
by morale problems in the dissension-ridden and politicized INS.
Despite the criticisms of specific portions of Mr. Roberts' proposal which appear below, it is important to reaffirm his deep concern for the quality of the process by which decisions interpreting
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) are made and for the
rights of the participants in the process. Although much could be
said in favor of reducing the role of immigration lawyers and
judges alike by reforming the "intake system" and many of the
substantive rules which are presently applicable, the most urgent
problem is that so many aliens, including those who do have
counsel, find it impossible to vindicate their legal rights in a fair,
inexpensive and expeditious manner.
THE LIMrrED SCOPE OF MR. ROBERTS' PROPOSAL

Perhaps because of his own experiences, Maurice Roberts
places primary emphasis on the conflicting roles of the Inumgration and Naturalization Service in performing both enforcement
however, that there are serious inadequacies in the present policies and practices
of the INS and the statute it administers.
2. It should be recognized, of course, that the Roberts proposal does not purport to be a panacea. A court, nonetheless, will be part of the Select Commission's
proposals.
3. It is not our intent to disparage the many dedicated and capable INS career officers who are sensitive to the public and devoted to a fair administration of
the immigration laws.
4. Roberts vividly describes the tensions between those in the INS who perform enforcement functions and those who have service functions. See Roberts,
Proposed: A Specialized Statutory Immigration Court. INS morale also suffers
from the politicization of immigration policy and control from outside the Service,
such as occurred recently in connection with the measures taken against alien stu-

dents and others from Iran when the White House staff was itself directing INS
policy.

[voL. 18: 29, 1980]

Immigration Court Considerations
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

and service functions. He perceptively describes the friction between officials charged with performing these functions, and,
more specifically, the unacceptable dependence of immigration
judges, formerly known as Special Inquiry Officers, and other
service personnel on enforcement officials. He notes, moreover,
the indifference of the Department of Justice toward the INS and
cites insufficient remuneration and prestige as contributing to an
environment which discourages many qualified individuals from
seeking to become immigration judges. He also criticizes the inability of immigration judges to adjudicate constitutional claims
and identifies a number of logistical problems, including judicial
dependence on the District Director's budgetary largesse and insufficient secretarial and other resources, which result in unwar5
ranted delays in the appellate process.
Maurice Roberts states that proposed reforms in the existing
system should be measured against three objectives: (1) immigration judges should receive compensation and security commensurate with the nature of their responsibility; (2) the
independence of immigration judges should be safeguarded by insulating them from direct or subtle pressures from enforcement
officials; and (3) the judges should receive adequate support serv6
ices.
While we share these laudable goals, there are additional deficiencies in the adjudicatory process that merit equal attention in
statutory reform. The evidentiary standards in exclusion and deportation hearings are excessively lax.7 Illegally obtained evidence and unreliable hearsay are admissible.8 Respondents lack
5. Roberts criticizes the fact that the Board of Immigration Appeals has to
follow the conflicting decisions of circuit courts of appeals. As pointed out by
Timothy Barker and Leon Wildes in their adjoining comments, this situation,
rather than being a problem, has illuminated issues for Supreme Court and legislative review. See note 13 infra.
6. Roberts, supra note 4, at 16.
7. The loose evidentiary standards that have been applied in exclusion and

deportation hearings are described in IA C. GORDON & H.
mON LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 3.20f, 5.10 (rev. ed. 1980).

ROSENFIELD,

IIGRA-

8. Several courts have recently refused to decide whether the exclusionary
rule is constitutionally required in deportation hearings. See, e.g., Lee v. INS, 590
F.2d 497, 502 (3d Cir. 1979). See Fragomen, The "Uncivil" Nature of Deportation:
Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights and the Exclusionary Rule, 45 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 29 (1978). Whether or not constitutionally mandated, the exclusionary rule
should, as a matter of policy, be applied to the INS. Moreover, prohibiting the INS
from making any use whatsoever of illegally obtained evidence would enhance the
public perception of the Service.

power to compel the attendance of witnesses and their own testimony may be involuntarily compelled.9 Hearing records are controlled by the immigration judges and the transcription of these
records is not always accurate in material respects. The denigration of immigration judges, therefore, is only one of our concerns
about the existing system which fails to provide aliens and other
interested parties with sufficient guarantees that, without unnecessary expense, they can secure a prompt and fair adjudication of
all their legal claims.
The Merits of a Specialized Immigration Court
A number of factors suggest that a specialized immigration
court is undesirable and that political considerations make its creation unlikely. Such a court cannot be justified on any of the
grounds that have previously led Congress to establish other specialized courts.10 As described by Mr. Justice Harlan in Glidden
Co. v. Zdanok:
In certain areas of federal judicial business there has been a felt need to
obtain,first, the special competence in complex, technical and important
matters that comes from narrowly focused inquiry; second, the speedy
resolution of controversies available on a docket unencumbered by other
and definition that comes from nationmatters; and, third, the certainty
12
wide uniformity of decision.

Although rather byzantine and convoluted, immigration and nationality law requires no scientific or highly technical skill on the
part of judges and is not extraordinarily complex. Indeed, there
exist other areas of law, such as trade regulation, which require
considerable knowledge of economics and other non-legal matters, but have not been singled out for specialized court treatment
despite respectable proposals to do so. Furthermore, unlike fields
for which other specialized courts have been created, such as patent law, there is no reason why the immigration law need be as
complex as it is today. It is hoped that proposals to revise the Immigration and Nationality Act will result in a significant simplifi9. See IA C. GORDON & H. RoSENFIELD, supra note 7, at § 5.10f.
10. Specialized courts currently operating include: the courts of the District of
Columbia; the territorial courts of Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone, Guam, and the
Virgin Islands; the Court of Claims; the Customs Court; the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals; the Tax Court and the Bankruptcy Court. See P. BATOR, P.
MxsiHna, D. SHAPmO, & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS

47-49 (2d ed. 1973). In addition, Congress created a
number of specialized courts which no longer exist. These included: the territorial courts, the Court of Private Land Claims, the Choctaw and Chickasaw Citizenship Court, the Commerce Court, the consular courts, the United States Court for
China, and the Emergency Court of Appeals. See 1 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.3 (2d ed. 1980).
11. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

12. Id. at 560.
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cation. Moreover, if the goal of allowing immigration judges to
reach constitutional issues and exercise supervisory powers over
the administrative process is realized, the adjudicatory authority
of immigration judges will be broadened considerably, extending
to the application of such basic constitutional concepts as due
process and equal protection.
Neither would a specialized immigration court, per se, significantly expedite the resolution of cases. The current delays do not
arise primarily from congestion in the federal courts or from the
lack of resources afforded immigration judges. The delays mainly
stem from overregulation, unnecessarily complex forms, administrative inefficiency, an understaffed and underfunded agency
overwhelmed by a multitude of cases deserving of prompt attention and applicants' seemingly limitless opportunity to seek to reopen or supplement the record in review proceedings. This
situation is exacerbated by the fact that an individual especially
aggrieved by a delay is left without effective judicial recourse to a
reasonable and inexpensive means of obtaining prompt adjudication.
Mr. Roberts also has not made the case for nationwide uniformity, the third traditional justification for a specialized court. Quite
to the contrary, a diversity of opinion has resulted, on a number
of occasions, in a more sensible and sympathetic application of
the immigration laws.' 3 Furthermore, under the Roberts proposal, where review of the immigration court's decisions would be
only by a grant of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court, we would
lose the active participation of the courts of appeals whose decisions clarify issues for ultimate resolution.
Writing on behalf of the American College of Trial Lawyers in
opposition to recent proposals to establish a specialized bankruptcy court,14 former Judge Simon H. Rifkind stated:
[T] he vitality of the Federal courts depends on the fact that district courts
13. For example, in Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976), the Second Circuit applied § 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to deportation proceedings on the ground that a strict construction of the waiver provision, which on
its face applies only to exclusion hearings, would violate equal protection. See
Mailman, 'Francis'--ACurrent Comity of Errors,N.Y.L.J., Dec. 31, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
14. The American College of Trial Lawyers was only one of a number of distinguished groups to oppose the creation of a specialized bankruptcy court. See, e.g.,
Bankruptcy Court Revision: Hearingson H.R. 8200 Before the Subcomm. on Civil
and ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 215-37 (1977) (statement of former Attorney General Griffin B. Bell).

are courts of general jurisdiction, whose judges are required to deal, on a
daily basis, with the full range of substantive law. Because of this basic
structure, changes in one area of the law influence the development of
other areas of law. New ideas are allowed to filter through the legal system, so the law does not become stagnant. 15
We agree and consider it particularly important to preserve a
role for the lower federal courts in considering immigration issues. Analysis of immigration law matters is not confined to review of the four corners of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
The immigration laws directly affect fundamental interests in our
foreign affairs and the rights of aliens and their American relatives and employers and, as such, they clearly have constitutional
dimensions. Thus, for example, the due process clause of the fifth
amendment clearly applies to procedures by which aliens may be
deported.16 Similarly, there are some limitations, under the equal
protection clause, on the extent to which the immigration laws
may discriminate between certain classes of aliens.17 Such constitutional issues should not be removed from the consideration
of the district courts and courts of appeals where judges frequently confront similar issues in different contexts.18 Addressing the prospect of a specialized bankruptcy court, Judge Rifkind
emphasized that "[i]f bankruptcy cases are tried in a specialized
bankruptcy court, they will be insulated from the rest of the
law."19 He also noted with alarm, that the creation of a specialized court would lead to a further specialization of the bar and
20
discourage general practitioners.
In sum, we are not impressed by the grounds for creating a specialized immigration court. Confining immigration cases almost
15. Rifldnd, Bankruptcy Code-Specialized Court Opposed, AM. BANKa. L.J. 187
(1978).
16. See IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFELD, supra note 7, § 5.5.
17. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (referring to a "limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation"). See also Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268
(2d Cir. 1976), discussed at note 13 supra.
18. Although the statute proposed by Maurice Roberts would preclude direct
appeals to the U.S. courts of appeals, it does not attempt to restrict the relief that
can presently be obtained in federal district court in certain cases. Section
106(a) (9) of the Immigration and Nationality Act preserves the right to attack an
order of deportation in a habeas corpus proceeding, which under § 106(b) is presently the only avenue for review of exclusion orders. In addition, suits for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief may be brought to obtain review of
determinations which are not final orders of deportation or exclusion. See Roberts, Judicial Review of Administrative Decision Under the Immigration and Nationality Laws, reprinted in Twelfth Annual Immigration and Naturalization
Institute at 593 (P.L.L Handbook No. 147, 1979). Congress may, in at least some
circumstances, restrict habeas corpus proceedings to article I courts. See Swain v.
Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977) (upholding such a restriction in the District of Columbia Code).
19. Rifiind, supra note 15, at 188.
20. Id.
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exclusively to such a court might well have a decidedly negative
impact upon the evolution of the law. Finally, judging from the
opposition that was recently directed at proposals for a specialized bankruptcy court, it is very likely that any proposal to create
a specialized immigration court would encounter significant, if not
insurmountable, opposition.21

THE CONSTrUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSED ARTICLE I COURT
Although Maurice Roberts' presentation does not expressly address the constitutionality of establishing a legislative or article I
immigration court with nontenured judges, the constitutionality
of such a court cannot be taken for granted. The question may be
stated simply as follows: would an immigration court with judges
appointed for fifteen-year terms run afoul of the requirement of
article III, section 1 of the Constitution that judges, both of the
Supreme and inferior courts, be appointed for life? Unfortunately, the analysis required to answer this question is by no
means simple. As stated by one scholar, "this is a most difficult
area of constitutional law. The precedents are horribly murky,
doctrinal confusion abounds, and the constitutional text is by no
means clear." 22
It should be stressed at the outset that although the Supreme
Court has on a number of occasions considered the constitutionality of article I courts, it has never found an article I court to be
per se unconstitutional. Indeed, the only limitations that the
Supreme Court has placed on the jurisdiction of non-article II
courts have occurred in the unique context of the military
courts. 23 At the same time, however, the relevant precedents
21. In opposing creation of the bankruptcy court, Judge Riflkind made two
other, albeit less substantial, objections which give some indication of the political
opposition that a proposal to create a specialized immigration court might provoke. First, he argued that a significant increase in the number of article M
judges would dilute the significance and prestige of district judgeships. Secondly,
he expressed concern about the ability to find an adequate number of persons to
fill the new bankruptcy judgeships without the wholesale appointment of bankruptcy referees. See Rifkind, supra note 15.
22. Letter from Prof. Thomas G. Krattenmaker to Hon. Peter Rodino (June 30,
1976) reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 4 at 2689 (1976) (hereinafter cited as Krattenmaker Letter).
23. The Supreme Court has held that the military courts may not constitutionally try- civilian dependents of servicemen, Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); civilian employees of the armed forces, McElroy v.

evince two markedly dissimilar approaches to the ability of Congress to establish a court with non-tenured judges. The approach
articulated in the most recent cases focuses on the existence of
"particularized needs" for such a court and suggests that the immigration court proposed by Maurice Roberts would be unconstitutional. By contrast, the other approach inquires into whether
the jurisdiction of an article I court would impermissibly include
matters that are "inherently judicial" and suggests that the proposed immigration court would be constitutional. After a brief
overview of the policy justifications for, and the implications of
the language of, article II, each of these approaches will be considered below.
An Overview of Article 111, Section 1
The constitutionality of the immigration court proposed by
Maurice Roberts is called into question by the requirement of lifetime tenure of article III, section 1 of the Constitution which provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme

Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated
which shall not be diTimes, receive for their Services a Compensation,
24
minished during their Continuance in Office.

Any analysis of the implications of the requirement that article
III judges receive tenure for life must take note of the highly significant public policy considerations involved. This requirement,
along with the guarantee that judicial salaries not be reduced, reflects the importance the framers of the Constitution placed on an
independent judiciary. Thus, the Supreme Court has stated that
the provisions "were designed to give judges maximum freedom
from possible coercion or influence by the executive or legislative
branches of the Government."2 5
Since the "judicial Power of the United States" includes "all
United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); former servicemen, United
States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); or servicemen charged with offenses that are not service-connected, O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
24. U.S. CONST. art. m, § 1.
25. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955). See also Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 410-22 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). A recent commentary identifies the following policies underlying the tenure and salary
provisions: the preservation of the separation of power among the three branches
of the federal government and between the national government and the states;
the promotion of the judiciary as an institution and the protection of judicial individualism; and the guarantee of impartiality and due process. Note, Article III

Limits on Article I Courts: The Constitutionalityof the Bankruptcy Court and the
1979 MagistrateAct, 80 COLUM. 1 REV. 560, 582-85 (1980).
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Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution [and]
the Laws of the United States," 26 it would appear, at first blush,
that either all issues arising under federal law must be adjudicated before a tenured article I court or that, at a minimum, all
courts established by Congress must conform to article III. Although either interpretation appears clearly consistent with the
text of article III, both have been uniformly rejected. In Palmore
v. United States,27 the most recent Supreme Court decision to
consider the constitutionality of an article I court, the Court
stated:
It is apparent that neither this Court nor Congress has read the Constitution as requiring every federal question arising under the federal la~v, or
even every criminal prosecution for violating an Act of Congress, to be
tried in an Art. III court before a judge enjoying lifetime tenure and protection against salary reduction. Rather, both Congress and this Court
have recognized that state courts are appropriate forums in which federal
questions and federal crimes may at times be tried ....28

As set forth below, 29 the Court then indicated that Congress

may, in certain circumstances, establish courts under article I of
the Constitution0 without affording judges the protections of arti26. U.S. CoxsT. art. II, § 2.
27. 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
28. Id. at 407.
29. See pp. 13-15 infra.
30. Article I, § 8 delegates to Congress the powers, inter alia:
To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization and uniform Laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such
District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular
States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places
purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the
Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards,
and other needful Buildings,--And
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof."
U.S. CONsT. art. I § 8.
In Ex parte Bakelite Corp., the Supreme Court stated.

It long has been settled that Article II does not express the full authority
of Congress to create courts, and that other Articles invest Congress with

power in the exertion of which it may create inferior courts and clothe

them with functions deemed essential or helpful in carrying those powers
into execution.
279 U.S. 438, 449 (1929).

cle III. Thus, it is clear that the constitutionality of the proposed
immigration court rests on the authority of Congress to establish
such a court in the exercise of powers delegated to it from
sources other than article ]IJ*31 Before analyzing the approaches
that the Supreme Court has used in dealing with the relationship
between article I and other grants of authority to Congress, it
should be stressed that article EI must mean more than that the
judges of the Supreme Court are entitled to lifetime tenure. Indeed, it would seem that article I creates a presumption, albeit a
rebuttable one, that if Congress decides to create judicial tribunals, it must establish courts that comport with article III requirements. 32 Such a presumption is strongly supported by both the
text of article III and the important policy considerations of judicial independence which support it.
The "ParticularizedNeeds" Approach of Palmore
In Palmore, the Supreme Court enunciated what appeared to
be a general approach to the authority of Congress to create article I courts without the guarantees of article I when it stated:
[T]he requirements of Art. I, which are applicable where laws of national applicability and affairs of national concern are at stake, must in
proper circumstances give way to accommodate plenary grants of power
to Congress to legislate with respect to specialized3 3areas having particularized needs and warranting distinctive treatment.

It is unclear whether the Court meant that the article I[I requirements always apply where "laws of national applicability
and affairs of national concern are at stake" or that, even when
such laws and concerns are at stake, Congress may by a plenary
grant of power dispense with those requirements "with respect to
specialized areas having particularized needs and warranting distinctive treatment." 34 This ambiguity, unfortunately, was not clarified in the analysis which led the Palmore Court to uphold the
constitutionality of the Congressional assignment of local crimi31. Unlike other specialized article I courts, an immigration court would not
be based on any of the specific delegations contained in article L Although the
Supreme Court initially viewed congressional authority regarding immigration to
be based upon its article I power to regulate foreign commerce, it has since analyzed the regulation of immigration as an incident of national sovereignty. Compare, eg., The Passenger Cases (Smith v. Turner), 48 U.S. 283 (1849) with, e.g.,
The Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. U.S.), 130 U.S. 581 (1889). Such a
view, however, should not affect the analysis of whether an immigration court with
non-tenured judges would be constitutional.
32. See note 43 infra; Krattenmaker Letter, supra note 22, at 2690.
33. 411 U.S. 389, 407-08 (1973).
34. The court's use of the term "specialized areas" is also ambiguous. Although it has been suggested that the term seems directed at geographic areas,
rather than particular subject matter areas, Note, supra note 25, at 577, such an
interpretation seems, as a matter of semantics, overly restrictive.
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nal cases in the nation's capital to the Superior Court of the Dis35
trict of Columbia, an article I court with non-tenured judges.
Nevertheless, both interpretations of Palmore are consistent

with the results, if not always the logic, of many prior decisions
upholding the constitutionality of other legislative courts. For example, the Supreme Court has upheld the validity of territorial
courts, 36 the Court of Private Land Claims,3 7 the Choctaw and
Chickasaw Citizenship Court,38 courts created in unincorporated
areas outside the mainland, 39 and consular courts established by
concessions from foreign countries.4 0 As stated in Mr. Justice
Harlan's plurality opinion in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok: "The touchstone of decision in all these cases has been the need to exercise

the jurisdiction then and for a transitory period."41
These precedents do not support the constitutionality of an arti-

cle I immigration court. Such a court would consider exclusively
"laws of national applicability" and "affairs of national concern."
Moreover, even if immigration is deemed to be a "specialized
area," within the meaning of Palmore,42 it is doubtful whether it
"[has] particularized needs and [warrants] distinctive treatment." Except insofar as an article I immigration court might be
considered as experimental, it could not, in contradistinction to
35. In concluding that the local courts for the District of Columbia warranted
distinctive treatment as article I courts, Justice White relied upon a number of significant facts. Initially, he noted that the courts in question were designed to handle primarily local cases and to serve as "a local court system for a large
metropolitan area." 411 U.S. at 408 (1973). He then recognized the Congressional
concern about the congestion previously existing in the federal district court and
court of appeals for the District and two critical needs resulting therefrom: first,
"to confine the work of those courts to that which, for the most part, they were
designed to do, namely, to try cases arising under the Constitution and the nationally applicable laws of Congress;" and, second, "to establish an entirely new court
system with functions essentially similar to those of the local courts found in the
50 states of the Union with responsibility for trying and deciding those distinctively local controversies that arise under local law, including local criminal laws
having little, if any, impact beyond the local jurisdiction." Id. at 409. Finally, the
Court took note of Congress' deliberate decision to follow the great majority of
states in creating judgeships with fixed terms, because "[i]t was thought that such
a system would be more workable and efficient in administering and discharging
the work of a multifaceted metropolitan court system." Id.
36. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) (Marshall, C.J.).
37. United States v. Coe, 155 U.S. 76 (1894).
38. Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445 (1899).
39. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
40. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
41. 370 U.S. 530, 547 (1962).
42. See note 34 supra.

the territorial courts, be regarded as transitory. Also, unlike the
local courts for the District of Columbia, an article I immigration

court would not, to a significant extent, be in response to congestion in constitutional courts. Finally, there is no apparent policy
justification for denying judges of a specialized immigration court
the guarantees of article IH, section 1.
Thus, adherence to the approach enunciated in Palmore would
lead to the conclusion that Congress could not constitutionally es-

tablish a specialized immigration court with non-tenured judges
in view of the national applicability of the immigration laws, the
affairs of national concern at stake, and the absence of particularized needs warranting distinctive treatment.4 3
The "InherentlyJudicial"Approach of Bakelite
Although Palmore's approach would seem to be one of general
applicability, a number of prior cases utilized an entirely different
approach to article I courts. These cases stand for the proposition
that the guarantees of article Ill need apply only to the adjudication of matters that are "inherently judicial." Since it would appear that claims against the United States arising under the
immigration and nationality laws generally involve "public rights"
which are not "inherently judicial," this approach leads to the
conclusion that an article I court would be constitutional.44
The doctrinal source of this approach is Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,45 where the Court upheld the
audit of accounts of customs officials by the Treasury and stated
that
there are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such
form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are
susceptible of judicial determination, but which congress may or may not
bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may
43. The conclusion that an article I immigration court would be unconstitutional draws some support from Justice Harlan's statement in Glidden that:
Whether constitutional limitations on the exercise of judicial power have
been held inapplicable has depended on the particular local setting, the
practical necessities, and the possible alternatives .... [T]his Court has
in the past entertained a presumption that even those territorial judges
who have been extended statutory assurances of life tenure and undiminished compensation have been so favored as a matter of legislative grace
and not a constitutional compulsion. . . . By a parity of reasoning, however, the presumption should be reversed when Congress creates courts
the continuing exercise of whose jurisdiction is unembarrassed by such
practical difficulties.
370 U.S. 530, 547-48 (1962).
44. Suits brought by private parties against the United States were initially
held to be entirely outside the article III judicial power. See Williams v. United
States, 289 U.S. 553, 565, 578 (1933). This view, however, was subsequently repudiated. E.g., Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 562-66 (1962).
45. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
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deem proper. 4 6

There, Mr. Justice Curtis further noted that "we do not consider
congress can . ..withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter
which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law,
or in equity or admiralty. ....47
An analysis of whether or not matters are "inherently judicial"
was found relevant in the context of article I courts in Ex Parte
Bakelite Corp.48 and Williams v. United States,49 which, respectively, held that the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals and the United States Court of Claims had been established under article I. In Bakelite, the Supreme Court stated that
"[1] egislative courts . . . may be created as special tribunals to
examine and determine various matters, arising between the government and others, which from their nature do not require judicial determination and yet are susceptible of it."50 Since in the
Court's view the jurisdiction conferred on the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals included "nothing which inherently or necessarily requires judicial determination,"5 ' it could have been and
was created as a legislative court. In Williams, the Supreme
Court applied a parallel analysis in upholding the validity of the
52
Court of Claims as an article I court.
Because Bakelite assumes that if Congress can delegate certain
matters to executive discretion, it -may delegate the adjudication
of those matters to an article I court, decisions bearing upon the
authority of the Immigration and Naturalization Service become
pertinent. Initially, it should be noted that, shortly after its decision in Bakelite, the Supreme Court in dicta quoted the first of
the above passages from Bakelite and stated: "[f] amiliar illustrations of administrative agencies created for the determination of
such matters are found in connection with the exercise of the congressional power as to ... immigration ....
To our knowledge, the Supreme Court has never found that
aliens have a constitutional right to a plenary hearing as to their
status in an article I court. To the contrary, the Court has up46. Id. at 284.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
279 U.S. 438 (1929).
289 U.S. 553 (1933).
279 U.S. at 451.
Id. at 453.
See, e.g., 289 U.S. at 579.
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932).

held the power of Congress to provide for the exclusion of aliens
solely by means of executive determination without creating any
right to judicial review of the propriety of an executive determination.54 Indeed, to the extent subsequent cases have deemed judicial review constitutionally required, the Court has allowed only
for the narrow review available in habeas corpus proceedings. 55
Although these cases provide strong support for the constitutionality of an article I immigration court, the Bakelite approach
is not without its problems. First, the Supreme Court decision in
Glidden casts some doubt on the continuing vitality of the Bakelite analysis. 5 6 Moreover, the failure of Palmore to make any reference to cases utilizing the "inherently judicial" test, much less
to explain the relationship between that test and its own "particularized needs" test, is perplexing. Finally, it can be argued that
although article III is not implicated when matters are left to the
resolution of the executive branch, its requirements apply once
matters come within the province of the federal judiciary. 57 Thus,
a recent commentator has stated that the "argument relying on
administrative agencies as precedents.., begs the question, because agencies do not implicate the policies of article III to the
54. See, e.g., United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905) (excluded alien who
claimed to be citizen was not entitled to challenge correctness of administrative

decision in habeas corpus proceeding). But see note 55 infra.
55. See, e.g., Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922) (excluded alien who
claimed to be a citizen was entitled to due process); Chin Yow v. United States,
208 U.S. 8, 12 (1908) ('The decision of the Department is final but that is on the
presupposition that the decision was after a hearing in good faith, however summary in form.").
56. In Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), a divided Court held that the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims were, contrary to
the conclusions of Bakelite and Williams, article EII courts. Although Justice
Harlan's plurality opinion quoted from Murray's Lessee, Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,
370 U.S. at 550-51, it also expressed "certain reservations" about the statements in
Bakelite and Williams that the jurisdictions of the courts in question included
"nothing which inherently or necessarily requires judicial determination," and declined to "explore the extent to which Congress may commit the execution of even
'inherently' judicial business to tribunals other than Article II courts." Id. at 549.
In a cryptic footnote relating to his reservations about the nature of the jurisdictions of the courts in question, Justice Harlan stated.
Williams itself recognized that the jurisdiction conferred on the Court of
Claims by the Tucker Act, now 28 U.S.C. § 1491, to award just compensation for a governmental taking, empowered that court to decide what had
previously been described as a judicial and not a legislative question...
As for Bakelite, its reliance.., on Cary v. Curtis, 3 How 236, for the proposition that disputes over customs duties may be adjudged summarily
without recourse to judicial proceedings, appears to have overlooked the
care with which that decision specifically declined to rule whether all right
of action might be taken away from a protestant, even going so far as to
suggest several judicial remedies that might have been available.
Id. at n.21 (citations omitted).
57. See Note, supra note 25, at 577-81.

[VOL. 18: 29, 1980]

Immigration Court Considerations
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

5
same extent as legislative courts."

8

Desirabilityof an Article III Court
In sum, the constitutionality of an article I immigration court
with non-tenured judges cannot be taken for granted.5 9 Although
the constitutionality of such a court might well be upheld, it is not
at all clear why, assuming arguendo the desirability of a specialized court, it would not be preferable from a public policy standpoint to establish the court under article Il and grant its judges
lifetime tenure. An article IR immigration court would further
the goal of raising the status and increasing the independence of
immigration judges. It would also have the advantage of allowing
immigration judges an opportunity to sit by designation in article
HI courts. This opportunity, which apparently would not be
opened to non-tenured article I judges,6 0 would widen the per58. Id. at 581. The same commentator also criticizes the "inherently judicial"
approach as follows:
IT] he "public rights" cases in which the test was first presented were traditionally resolved by the political branches because the doctrine of sovereign immunity prevented article I courts from hearing them. But once
sovereign immunity is lifted such cases fall within the article MI subject
matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, allocation of such cases to a legislative
court raises the same constitutional questions as would any allocation of
article HI cases to a non-article-rn federal tribunal. Thus, the "inherently
judicial" test, which looks to past practice, offers little guidance concerning the future scope of congressional power to circumvent article i's tenure and salary provisions.
Id. at 580-81.
From this perspective, mention should be made of Justice Brandeis' statement
in Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568 (1926) (district court decision in naturalization proceeding was a "case or controversy" and therefore appealable), that
"[wlhether a proceeding which results in a grant is a judicial one, does not depend upon the nature of the thing granted, but upon the nature of the proceeding
which Congress has provided for securing the grant." Id. at 576. Although Tutun
does not imply that naturalization is "inherently judicial", it is consistent with the
notion that if Congress provides for judicial proceedings for certain immigration
matters, they must take place in an article I court. See also note 56 supra.
59. The law regarding article I courts may be clarified if the Supreme Court
rules on the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Court or the Magistrate Act of
1979. See Note, supra note 25; Plumb, The Tax Recommendations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws-Tax Procedures, 88 HARv. L REV. 1360, 1457-69
(1975).
60. The premise of Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), was that Congress may not authorize judges of a legislative court to sit by designation on an
article Il court. See also Note, 69 HARv. I- REV. 760 (1956). This premise necessarily implies certain limitations on the extent to which 'Judicial power" can be
conferred on article I courts.

spectives of immigration judges and thus lessen the risk that a
specialized immigration court would become insular.
Shortcomings of the ProposedStatute Creating an Immigration
Court
Notwithstanding our opposition to the creation of a specialized
immigration court, the Roberts proposal does not fulfill all the
goals we would seek were one to be established. Perhaps the
most important defect in the proposed statute is that appeals
from the appellate division of the immigration court lie only by
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. In addition to insulating the new court and drastically reducing the beneficial role
the inferior federal courts now play in interpreting the immigration laws, this provision would prevent all but a handful of litigants from obtaining appellate review in a constitutional court.
The only possible justification for restricting appeals in this
manner would be a belief that the appellate division of the immigration court would almost always provide a sufficient forum for
appeal and that to provide automatic appeals from that body
would result in an unnecessary proliferation of litigation. Such a
justification, however, is unpersuasive. Litigants from adverse decisions of other specialized courts, such as the Tax Court and the
Bankruptcy Court, can appeal as of right to the courts of appeals. 61 Although the statute proposed by Maurice Roberts does
not attempt to preclude the relief that can now be sought in district courts, 62 its failure to allow review of immigration cases in

the courts of appeals is unnecessary as a matter of law and unwise as a matter of policy.
Moreover, the Roberts proposal overly restricts the jurisdiction
of the immigration court. The jurisdiction of the trial division
could profitably be expanded to include naturalization cases, adjudication of applications for discretionary relief and appeals from
adverse decisions of the Regional Commissioner. In addition,
consideration should be given to using the immigration court to
review certain foreign consular visa decisions and appeals from
adverse decisions of the State Department's Board of Appellate
Review.
The proposed statute does not go nearly as far as it should to
provide additional procedural safeguards for aliens. Instead, it
leaves critical decisions regarding the formulation of rules of evidence and procedure to the discretion of the new court. As noted
61. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 160, 1293 (West Supp. 1980) (appeals from Bankruptcy
Court); 26 U.S.C. § 7482 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979) (appeals from Tax Court).

62. See note 18 supra.
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above, aliens should be granted the substantial equivalent of the
benefits of the rules applicable in article I courts.
Finally, the Roberts proposal misses the opportunity to provide
for the creation of supervisory powers over the INS in the manner
that the federal courts of appeals oversee the functioning of the
district courts. Such supervision could significantly reduce the
delays which so often severely prejudice those who have to deal
with the immigration service.
CONCLUSION

Maurice Roberts' proposal to create an article I immigration
court achieves, in large measure, the important goal of elevating
the status of immigration judges and isolating them from the influence of the enforcement side of the INS. At the same time,
however, it leaves unremedied many existing problems and creates new ones. The serious problems inherent in any specialized
court would reach a clearly unacceptable level if, as proposed, the
role of federal district courts and courts of appeals were to be restricted severely. Yet, even if the present jurisdiction of the
courts of appeals to review immigration cases were protected, the
merits of creating a specialized immigration court would remain
dubious. Moreover, the establishment of a specialized immigration court under article I, rather than under article II, is questionable on both constitutional and policy grounds.
The Roberts proposal also fails to enhance the procedural rights
of aliens who currently have little assurance that their cases will
be adjudicated in an expeditious and fair manner. Although th6
desire to elevate the status of immigration judges and to furnish
them with adequate resources is important indeed, the need to
provide aliens with guarantees of basic justice is equally, if not
more, pressing. It may well be that truly meaningful change can
only come as a result of a major revision of the immigration laws
and a new commitment of resources to a restructured Immigration and Naturalization Service. However, whether within the
contours of the present decision-making structure of the INS or
under new structures, such as the one proposed by Maurice Roberts, additional protections for the rights of aliens and of our national interests should be incorporated.
The need to improve the plight of immigration judges cannot be
separated from the need to address the systemic problems that

plague those whose rights are affected by the administration of
the immigration laws. Indeed, these two needs are inexorably intertwined. One must question the extent to which the changes
proposed by Maurice Roberts will improve the existing system as
a whole. One must also ask whether, without more fundamental
changes that ultimately alter the public perception of the INS,
many more qualified and gifted people will seek career positions,
as judges or agency personnel, in the immigration field.

